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Religious Commitment and Identity: 
Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem 
Richard Moon* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the recent case of Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem,
1
 the Supreme 
Court of Canada held that a condominium association’s refusal to permit 
Orthodox Jewish unit-owners (the appellants) to construct succahs on 
their balconies, as part of the Jewish festival of Succot, breached their 
freedom of religion under the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and 
Freedoms.
2
 Because the restriction on religious practice was imposed by 
a non-state actor, the Canadian Charter of Rights was not applicable.
3
 
However, the majority judgment of Iacobucci J. was clear that “the 
principles ... applicable in cases where an individual alleges that his or 
her freedom of religion is infringed under the Quebec Charter” are also 
applicable to a claim under section 2(a) of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms.
4
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1
  [2004] S.C.J. No. 46, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551 [hereinafter “Amselem”]. 
2
  Section 3 of the Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q. 1977, c. C-12 [herein-
after “Quebec Charter”] provides as follows: “Every person is the possessor of fundamental free-
doms, including freedom of conscience, freedom of religion, freedom of opinion, freedom of 
expression, freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association.” 
Other relevant sections of the Quebec Charter include:  
Section 6: “Every person has a right to the peaceful enjoyment of and free disposition of his 
property, except to the extent provided by law”. 
Section 9.1: “In exercising his fundamental freedoms and rights, a person shall maintain a 
proper regard for democratic values, public order and the general well-being of the citizens 
of Quebec”. 
3
  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “the Charter”]. 
4
  Amselem, supra, note 1, at para. 37. Justice Iacobucci in Amselem, id., at para. 36 
acknowledged that while the content and scope of religious freedom is the same in both documents, 
“the interplay of the rights in the Quebec Charter is governed by its unique content and structure.” 
Justice Bastarache, in his dissenting judgment, made the same assumption: 
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In holding that the condominium association had violated the appel-
lants’ freedom of religion, the majority judgment of Iacobucci J. made 
two significant determinations concerning the scope of the freedom. 
First, Iacobucci J. held that freedom of religion under section 3/section 
2(a) protects practices that are not part of an established religious belief 
system. A spiritual practice or belief will fall under the protection of 
section 3/section 2(a), even though it is entirely personal, and not part of 
a more widely-held religious belief system. Second, a practice will be 
protected under section 2(a)/section 3 even though it is not regarded as 
obligatory by the individual claimant. Freedom of religion protects 
cultural practices that have spiritual significance for the individual, 
“subjectively connecting” him or her to the divine. 
I will argue that these two holdings do not sit easily together. The 
first suggests that religious beliefs/practices are a personal matter and 
should be protected under the single right to freedom of conscience and 
religion, because they have been chosen by the individual or because 
they are the outcome of his or her autonomous judgment. The second 
holding suggests that spiritual beliefs are different from other moral and 
fundamental beliefs and practices and should receive special protection 
because they are part of an individual’s deeply-rooted cultural identity, 
and connect him or her to a larger cultural/religious community. I will 
also argue that this tension or ambiguity in the court’s approach to reli-
gious freedom, and more deeply in its conception of religious commit-
ment, runs through the section 2(a) jurisprudence of the Supreme Court 
of Canada. Finally, I will suggest that this tension may be unavoidable 
― that religion is both a matter of personal commitment and cultural 
identity and that the challenge for the courts is to fit this complex under-
standing of religion into a rights model that seems to make a firm dis-
tinction between choices that are protected as a matter of human liberty 
(and subject to the rights and interests of others) and (unchangeable) 
                                                                                                                                
Freedom of conscience and religion is guaranteed by s. 3 of the Quebec Charter and s. 2(a) 
of the Canadian Charter. Although most, if not all, of this Court’s decisions relating to 
freedom of religion have interpreted s. 2(a) of the Canadian Charter, it is appropriate to re-
fer to them in interpreting s. 3 of the Quebec Charter, given the similarity in the wording of 
the two provisions. 
(Amselem, id., at para. 132). 
Section 2 provides that “Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: (a) freedom of 
conscience and religion”. 
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traits or attributes that must be respected as part of a commitment to 
human equality.  
II. THE MAJORITY JUDGMENT OF IACOBUCCI J.: RELIGION AS 
PERSONAL AND CULTURAL  
The appellants were unit owners in the Northcrest condominium in 
Montreal. They wished to construct succahs on their balconies, to fulfil 
what they regarded as their biblically-mandated obligation to dwell in a 
small, enclosed, temporary hut during the nine-day festival of Succot.
5
 
The condominium by-laws, to which all unit owners formally agreed 
prior to purchasing or occupying their particular unit, prohibited decora-
tions, alterations and constructions on their balconies.
6
 However, the by-
laws also provided that an individual owner might apply to the condo-
minium association for an exemption from this general prohibition. The 
appellants applied for permission to construct their succahs. The asso-
ciation, though, was unwilling to grant the exemption and instead pro-
posed that a communal succah be erected in the condominium gardens. 
The appellants did not regard the communal succah as an acceptable 
alternative. They rejected the association’s proposal and proceeded to 
erect succahs on their balconies. The association applied to the courts 
for an order requiring the removal of the shelters.  
                                                                                                                                
5
  Justice Iacobucci in Amselem, id., at paras. 5 and 6 described the practice: 
A succah is a small enclosed temporary hut or booth, traditionally made of wood or other 
materials such as fastened canvas, and open to the heavens, in which, it has been acknowl-
edged, Jews are commanded to ‘dwell’ temporarily during the festival of Succot, which 
commences annually with nightfall on the fifteenth day of the Jewish month of Tishrei. This 
nine-day festival, which begins in late September or early- to mid-October, commemorates 
the 40 year period during which, according to Jewish tradition, the Children of Israel wan-
dered in the desert, living in temporary shelters. .... 
… 
Orthodox Jews observe this biblically mandated commandment of ‘dwelling’ in a succah by 
transforming the succah into the practioner’s primary residence for the entire holiday peri-
od. They are required to take all their meals in the succah; they customarily conduct certain 
religious ceremonies in the succah; they are required, weather permitting, to sleep in the 
succah; and they are otherwise required to generally make the succah their primary abode 
for the entirety of the festival period, health and weather permitting. 
6
  Paragraph 9.3 of the condominium by-laws provided, among other things, that “No bal-
cony or porch may be decorated, covered, enclosed or painted in any way whatsoever without the 
prior written permission of the co-owners or the Board of Directors, as the case may be.” (Amselem, 
at para. 9.) 
204  Supreme Court Law Review (2005), 29 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 
Justice Iacobucci, writing for the majority, held that the application 
of the condominium by-law in this case amounted to a restriction on the 
appellants’ freedom of religion. Significantly, he held that the by-law 
restricted their freedom, even though several of them did not believe 
that they were under a religious obligation to erect a succah on their 
own property and accepted that their spiritual obligations could be met 
by residing in a communal succah, or a succah at the home of a friend or 
relative. Only one of the appellants, Mr. Amselem, believed he was 
under an obligation to reside in his own succah, but he also accepted 
that this obligation ceased if a personal succah was not available. Justice 
Iacobucci held that “both obligatory as well as voluntary expressions of 
faith should be protected under the Quebec (and the Canadian) Char-
ter.”7 According to Iacobucci J., “[i]t is the religious or spiritual essence 
of an action, not any mandatory or perceived-as-mandatory nature of its 
observance, that attracts protection.”8 Even though not all of the appel-
lants regarded the practice of erecting, and residing in, a succah on their 
own property as a religious obligation, the practice was protected as a 
matter of religious freedom, because it connected them with the divine. 
It had for them a “nexus with religion ... either by being objectively or 
subjectively obligatory or customary, or by, in general, subjectively 
engendering a personal connection with the divine or with the subject or 
object of the individual’s spiritual faith.”9 
Justice Iacobucci recognized that the same result might have been 
reached in this case without holding that non-mandatory spiritual prac-
tices were protected under section 3/section 2(a). While the appellants 
believed that they were obligated to reside in a succah, they did not 
believe that they were under a more specific duty to reside in a personal 
succah. However, they argued that, in the circumstances, preventing 
them from constructing their own succahs, and, in effect, requiring them 
to reside in a far less convenient communal succah, placed a significant 
                                                                                                                                
7
  Amselem, supra, note 1, at para. 47. 
8
  Id., at para. 47. 
9
  Id., at para. 56. According to Iacobucci J.: “freedom of religion encompasses not only 
what adherents feel sincerely obliged to do, but also includes what an individual demonstrates he or 
she sincerely believes or is sincerely undertaking in order to engender a connection with the divine 
or with the subject or object of his or her spiritual faith.” (id., at para.72.) Justice Iacobucci con-
cluded that the proper test is “whether the appellants sincerely believe that dwelling in or setting up 
their own individual succah is of religious significance to them, irrespective of whether they 
subjectively believe that their religion requires them to build their own succah. This is because it is 
hard to qualify the value of religious experience.” (id., at para.72) (emphasis omitted). 
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burden on their religious practice, and so represented an indirect restric-
tion on their religious practice.
10
 The by-law prohibition made their 
religious practice significantly more onerous or burdensome, and so 
discouraged them from fulfilling their obligation. 
According to Iacobucci J., if the appellants’ argument was that they 
must build their own succahs, because the alternative “[would] subjec-
tively lead to extreme distress” then they must prove that the alterna-
tives would “result in more than trivial or insubstantial interferences and 
non-trivial distress.”11 Justice Iacobucci thought that this had been es-
tablished. He noted that the appellants would have to carry their food for 
every meal from their unit to the communal succah. He also accepted 
that an intimate family celebration would be impossible in a communal 
succah, because the different appellants would have to eat their meals 
together.
12
 Moreover, Iacobucci J. recognized that the obligation to 
reside in a succah had a subjective or experiential dimension. The obli-
gation “must be complied with festively and joyously,” which might not 
be possible if the appellants were “forced” to relocate to a communal 
succah.
13
 
According to Iacobucci J., the appellants’ claim that the condomin-
ium by-law (and the proposed communal alternative) amounted to an 
indirect restriction on their religious practice was distinct from the ar-
gument that residence in a personal succah, while not obligatory, should 
be protected because it connected the appellants to the spiritual realm. 
He accepted that: 
[t]o some, the religious and spiritual significance of building and 
eating in one’s own succah could vastly outweigh the significance of a 
                                                                                                                                
10 
 See e.g., R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd., [1986] S.C.J. No. 70, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713. 
In that case, the Supreme Court of Canada held that s. 2(a) was breached by an indirect restriction 
on religious practice. The Court accepted that an Ontario law, which prohibited retailers from 
operating on Sundays, did not have a religious purpose but was intended simply to create a com-
mon pause day. Nevertheless, the Court recognized that a prohibition on Sunday retailing would put 
significant pressure on the religious practice of those storekeepers, who wished to keep Saturday as 
the Sabbath. A store that was closed on both Saturday and Sunday might not be commercially 
viable and so a retailer who believed herself or himself to be under a religious obligation to keep 
Saturday as the Sabbath would be faced with the difficult choice of either losing his or her business 
or operating on Saturday contrary to her/his faith. The Court, however, went on to uphold the law 
under s. 1. 
11
  Supra, note 1, at para. 75. 
12
  Id., at para. 77. 
13
  Id., at para. 73. 
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strict fulfilment of the biblical commandment of ‘dwelling’ in a 
succah, and that, in and of itself would suffice in grounding a claim of 
freedom of religion.
14
  
Yet the only obvious reason why residing in a personal succah would 
connect the appellants with the divine more fully or powerfully was that 
a personal succah would be a more convenient, or less burdensome, 
place of residence than the communal alternative. 
Justice Iacobucci further held that a religious practice is protected 
under section 2(a), even though it is not part of an established belief 
system or a belief system that is shared by others. According to 
Iacobucci J., a practice is protected “irrespective of whether [it] is re-
quired by official religious dogma or is in conformity with the position 
of religious officials.” In his view, “[r]eligious fulfilment is by its very 
nature subjective and personal” and so the only issue for the court, when 
determining whether an act is protected under section 2(a) of the Cana-
dian Charter or section 3 of the Quebec Charter, is whether the claimant 
is sincere in her or his belief.
15
  
In this case, said Iacobucci J., preventing the appellants from erect-
ing their own succahs amounted to a non-trivial interference with their 
religious practice. While the appellants might dwell in a communal 
succah or in a succah at the home of friends or relatives, these alterna-
tives would not have the same spiritual significance or would be highly 
inconvenient. Justice Iacobucci went on to hold that the condominium 
association had not established the need for restriction. In his view, the 
interests of the other unit owners in the peaceful enjoyment of their 
property and in personal security were insufficient to justify the limit on 
the appellants’ freedom of religion. In response to the safety concerns 
raised by the association, Iacobucci J. noted that the appellants had 
agreed to set up their succahs so that they would not obstruct the fire 
escape routes. The aesthetic concerns raised by the appellants, he re-
garded as insignificant. He noted that only a small number of succahs 
would be erected for nine days in the year. Moreover, the association 
                                                                                                                                
14
  Id., at para. 72. 
15
  Id., at para. 52, per Iacobucci J.: 
the court’s role in assessing sincerity is intended to ensure that a presently asserted religious 
belief is in good faith, neither fictitious nor capricious, and that it is not an artifice. Other-
wise, nothing short of a religious inquisition would be required to decipher the innermost 
beliefs of human beings. 
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could require that the succahs be constructed so as to blend in, as much 
as possible, with the general appearance of the building. Justice 
Iacobucci concluded that: 
 In the final analysis ... the alleged intrusions or deleterious effects 
on the respondent’s rights or interests under the circumstances are, at 
best, minimal and thus cannot be reasonably considered as imposing 
valid limits on the exercise of the appellant’s religious freedom.
16
 
III. THE DISSENTING JUDGMENT OF BASTARACHE J.: RELIGION AS 
PAROCHIAL AND CATHOLIC 
The dissenting judgment of Bastarache J. adopted a much narrower 
approach to the scope of freedom of religion. Justice Bastarache argued 
that a practice is protected under section 3/section 2(a) only if it is part 
of an established religious belief system and only if it is regarded by the 
individual claimant as a mandatory part of that system.  
While Bastarache J. acknowledged the personal and private nature 
of religious belief, he also accepted that “religion is a system of beliefs 
and practices based on certain religious precepts.”17 In his view, an 
individual who claims that his or her beliefs or practices fall within the 
protection of section 3/section 2(a) must show a “nexus” between his or 
her personal beliefs and the precepts of his or her religion.
18
 This con-
nection between personal belief and established religious precepts that 
“constitute a body of objectively identifiable data” enabled Bastarache J. 
to distinguish between “genuine religious beliefs and personal choices 
or practices that are unrelated to freedom of conscience.”19  
In the case of those appellants (all but Mr. Amselem), who did not 
believe that they had a particular obligation to reside in a personal suc-
cah, Bastarache J. found no breach of section 3 of the Quebec Charter. 
                                                                                                                                
16
  Id., at para. 84. 
17
  Id., at para. 135. 
18
  Id., at para. 135. 
19
  Id., at para. 135. Justice Bastarache continued, at para. 135:  
Connecting freedom of religion to precepts provides a basis for establishing objectively 
whether the fundamental right in issue has been violated. By identifying with a religion, an 
individual makes it known that he or she shares a number of precepts with other followers 
of the religion. The approach I have adopted here requires not only a personal belief, but 
also a genuine connection between the belief and the person’s religion. 
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In his view, the inconvenience suffered by the appellants, because they 
were prohibited from erecting their own succahs, was not enough to 
“elevate the preference [for their own succahs] to the status of a manda-
tory practice.”20  
Mr. Amselem, however, believed he was under an obligation to 
construct his own succah (although not if it was impossible to do so) 
and so Bastarache J. went on to consider section 9.1 of the Quebec 
Charter, which provided that, “in exercising his/her fundamental free-
dom and rights” an individual was to “maintain a proper regard for 
democratic values, public order and the general well-being of the citi-
zens of Quebec.”21 While Bastarache J. accepted that “the communal 
succah would be a source of inconvenience for Mr. Amselem,” he also 
recognized that the individual succah would be “a source of genuine 
inconvenience for the other co-owners.”22 For Bastarache J., it was 
particularly significant that an individual succah erected on a balcony 
might block emergency routes. He concluded that since Mr. Amselem’s 
freedom of religion could not be exercised in harmony with the rights 
and freedoms of others, the infringement of his right was legitimate.
23
 
Justice Bastarache’s requirement, under section 3/section 2(a), that 
the individual’s belief be part of an established religious belief system 
may rest on the view that freedom of religion protects religious or 
cultural minorities within the community, and not, or not simply, indi-
vidual conscience in moral or spiritual matters. But if cultural/religious 
identity or diversity is the focus of section 3/section 2(a) then it is 
unclear why non-mandatory religious/cultural practices should be 
denied protection. Moreover, if the purpose of section 3/section 2(a) is 
to protect religious/cultural minorities, some accommodation of mi-
nority practices should be granted, more perhaps than Bastarache J. 
was willing to allow.  
                                                                                                                                
20
  Id., at para. 162. 
21
  As Bastarache J. noted in Amselem, id., at para. 152, s. 9.1 of the Quebec Charter is not 
simply a limitations provision ― an equivalent to s. 1 of the Canadian Charter ― particularly in its 
application to infringements by private individuals. 
22
  Id., at para. 177. Yet, according to the trial judge, this was more than an inconvenience 
for Mr. Amselem, who believed that he was obligated to erect his own succah.  
23
  Id., at para. 180. According to Bastarache J., at para. 177, Mr. Amselem had been un-
willing to compromise in any way: 
... the application of s. 9.1 does not simply presuppose an accommodation approaching ex-
treme tolerance by all rights holders other than Mr. Amselem. He, too, is part of the multi-
cultural society that demands reconciliation of the rights of all. 
(2005), 29 S.C.L.R. (2d) Religious Commitment and Identity 209 
 
Another possibility is that Basatarche J.’s approach is based on a 
very specific understanding of religion. The justification and scope of 
freedom of religion was initially shaped by a Protestant conception of 
religious adherence, which saw religious belief as a personal and private 
commitment based on individual reason and judgment. Justice Basta-
rache may be drawing on a different conception of religion, and reli-
gious commitment; one that emphasizes the social and institutional 
character of religion, and regards religious belief not simply as a per-
sonal matter, but as tied to an established system and an institutional 
structure.
24
 
IV. JUSTICE BINNIE’S DISSENTING JUDGMENT: RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM AS SHIELD AND SWORD 
Justice Iacobucci rejected the condominium association’s argument 
that the appellants waived their freedom of religion rights when they 
purchased their units and agreed to the by-laws. In his view, even if it 
was possible for an individual to waive her or his right to religious free-
dom, the appellants could not be understood to have done so in this 
case. While they signed the Declaration of Co-ownership, which in-
cluded the by-law restricting the use of the unit balconies, this did not 
amount to a waiver of their right to practice their religion. First, the 
waiver was not unconditional, since the prohibition was subject to ex-
emptions. Second, it was not voluntary, since the appellants had no 
choice but to sign the declaration, if they wanted to reside in the build-
ing. Moreover, they had not read the by-laws and so did not know to 
what they were agreeing. Third, the waiver was not explicit, since it did 
not make specific reference to the affected Charter right.  
Justice Binnie, dissenting, did not think it necessary for the associa-
tion to establish that the appellants had waived their freedom of religion, 
when they formally agreed to the condominium by-laws. In his view, 
when the appellants agreed to the by-laws, the other unit owners were 
entitled to conclude that the practice of their religion was compatible 
with these rules. “There is a vast difference,” said Binnie J., “between 
                                                                                                                                
24
  In this regard, I note also that in Amselem, id., at para. 137, Bastarache J. described a 
secular justification (of religious freedom) as one that is “free of moral considerations.” One 
explanation for this odd description of the secular is that Bastarache J. believes that morality is 
inseparable from religion so that there is no such thing as a secular or non-religious morality.  
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using freedom of religion as a shield against interference with religious 
freedoms by the State and as a sword against co-contractors in a private 
building.”25 In holding the appellants to their agreement, Binnie J. 
stressed the following factors: that the appellants were in the best posi-
tion to determine, prior to their purchase of a unit in the building, what 
their religion required; that they could have purchased a unit in another 
building; that they had chosen not to read the by-laws when they entered 
into the contract with the other unit owners; and, finally, that they had 
rejected the accommodation of a communal succah, offered by the asso-
ciation, even though this accommodation was not inconsistent with their 
religious beliefs.  
If religious commitment is, as the majority judgment described it, 
personal and individual, then Binnie J.’s response seems the right one. A 
particular religious practice has no intrinsic value, at least from a public 
perspective external to the belief system. An individual’s religious prac-
tice or belief is valuable because he or she has chosen it or made a per-
sonal commitment to it. As Binnie J. recognized, who better to 
determine the content of an individual’s personal religious commitment 
than the individual personally? When an individual undertakes not to 
perform a particular act or practice, others might reasonably assume that 
he or she is not, or at least not deeply, committed to the particular prac-
tice. Since religion is a personal matter (a matter of conscience) others 
can only rely on the individual’s statements about what is important to 
him or her ― about what he or she thinks he or she can and cannot do 
without. More fundamentally, if religious practice is personal, and pro-
tected as a matter of autonomy or liberty, then an individual should be 
free to decide that he or she does not want or need to take certain ac-
tions, or he or she should be free to bind himself/or herself contractually 
not to take certain actions. Provided it is given voluntarily, an individ-
ual’s undertaking not to act on a particular belief or judgment is also an 
expression of his or her autonomous judgment.  
However, the issue of waiver or consent may be less straightfor-
ward, if religious belief or practice is regarded as a matter of cultural 
identity that must be accommodated or treated with equal respect by 
both public and private actors. Justice Binnie seemed to assume that the 
condominium association could refuse to sell a unit to anyone who for 
                                                                                                                                
25
  Id., at para. 185. 
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religious reasons objected to the by-laws. In his view, prospective pur-
chasers, who were unwilling or unable to agree to the by-laws, could 
choose to purchase a unit in another building. But if the condominium 
association is obligated to accommodate minority religious practices, 
then it cannot condition the sale of one of its units on the purchaser’s 
agreement not to practice his or her religion, or more particularly not to 
erect a succah on the unit’s balcony.  
V. THE PERSISTENT TENSION: RELIGION AS PERSONAL 
COMMITMENT AND CULTURAL IDENTITY 
While the formal defence of religious freedom in modern liberal 
democracies, such as Canada, emphasizes the value of individual auton-
omy or choice, the protection of religious freedom sometimes seems to 
rest on the idea that religion is a matter of social or cultural identity. 
Religious commitment is viewed by the courts, and by the general pub-
lic, as not simply, or not always, a matter of individual choice or rea-
soned judgment. It is regarded also, or instead, as a deeply rooted part of 
the individual’s identity or character that should be treated with equal 
respect. 
This uncertainty about religious adherence, as a matter of personal 
choice, judgment or commitment or as a matter of identity manifests 
itself in a series of closely related doctrinal tensions in the Canadian 
religious freedom cases. First, it shows itself in judicial uncertainty 
about the scope of the freedom ― about whether the freedom protects 
all deeply held views or beliefs or whether it protects only, or princi-
pally, religious beliefs and practices, which are in some way different 
from other (non-religious) beliefs/practices. If autonomy is the value 
that underlies our commitment to freedom of religion or conscience, 
then the freedom’s protection should extend equally to religious and 
non-religious beliefs and practices. Yet despite the courts’ formal hold-
ing that freedom of religion/conscience protects secular values/beliefs, 
religious beliefs and practices continue to be at the centre of the Cana-
dian freedom of religion/conscience cases. The courts seem to regard 
religious beliefs and practices as different from other beliefs/practices, 
and as requiring special constitutional treatment. 
Second, the courts’ ambiguous view of religious commitment shows 
itself in their uncertainty about the nature of the wrong addressed by the 
freedom. The courts remain unclear whether the freedom simply prohibits 
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coercive state action (state restriction of religious belief/practice, or state 
compulsion to follow the practices of a particular faith) or whether it goes 
further and prohibits the state from supporting or favouring a particular 
religious belief system, because religious preference by the state signals to 
the members of the non-favoured religious groups that they do not de-
serve the same respect as others or are not fully part of the political com-
munity. Despite their frequent assertions that section 2(a) is breached only 
when the state engages in religious coercion, either restricting or compel-
ling religious practices, the courts have held, on several occasions, that 
state support for a particular religious practice amounts to a breach of 
section 2(a). In these cases, religious freedom seems to require the equal 
or even-handed treatment of different belief systems and not simply the 
protection of the individual’s freedom to make her or his own judgments 
about religious truth and to act in accordance with that truth.  
Third, this ambiguity about religious commitment shows itself in 
the courts’ uncertainty about the place of religion in public debate and 
decision-making. While the courts have sometimes said or assumed that 
religious beliefs/values have a role to play in public decision-making, at 
other times they seem to accept that religion is not properly part of pub-
lic life or political decision-making and that state reliance on, or prefer-
ence for, a particular religion, in the formulation of public policy, 
amounts to the imposition of religion on non-believers or to discrimina-
tion against the adherents of those religious belief systems that are not 
favoured. The courts remain uncertain whether religious belief should 
be seen as contestable opinion/judgment, an ordinary part of public 
debate and decision-making, or whether it should be seen as a matter of 
personal or cultural identity, as non-rational, and therefore outside the 
scope of legitimate public debate and action.  
Finally, judicial ambiguity about the value of religion and the nature 
of religious commitment shows itself in the courts’ uncertainty about the 
character of public secularism. Even when the courts accept or assume 
that public secularism involves the exclusion of religion from the public 
sphere, they are sometimes uncertain about its neutrality. They are uncer-
tain whether secularism (understood as the exclusion of religion) repre-
sents a neutral ground that lies outside religious controversy (and provides 
the baseline against which religious restriction, compulsion and inequality 
are measured) or whether it should be seen as a partisan non-religious or 
anti-spiritual perspective that is in competition with religious world views.  
This ambiguity about the character of religious commitment points 
to larger questions about individual agency and the distinction often 
(2005), 29 S.C.L.R. (2d) Religious Commitment and Identity 213 
 
made between matters of identity, which are fixed or rooted, and matters 
of choice, which are revisable and not part of the individual’s identity. 
Religious belief is not simply a fixed attribute or characteristic. The 
individual’s commitment to a set of religious beliefs rests on her or his 
judgment or acceptance that they are true or right and that other views 
are false. As such these beliefs must, in theory at least, be open to re-
consideration on the basis of evidence or argument. But religion is not 
simply a personal choice or preference. It is deeply rooted, and tied to 
the individual’s social or cultural membership. It shapes the individual’s 
understanding of himself or herself and the world around.  
In Amselem, Iacobucci J. followed the Court’s previous judgments 
and described freedom of religion as an individual choice: “This court 
has long articulated an expansive definition of religion, which revolves 
around the notion of personal choice and individual autonomy and free-
dom.”26 Yet, he also suggested that religious commitment is deeply 
rooted ― an aspect of the individual’s identity, “integrally linked to 
one’s self-definition.”27 Indeed, it may be that religious commitment is 
both a personal choice and a deeply rooted part of the individual’s iden-
tity that shapes his or her world-view and self-definition.
28
 In the section 
that follows I will argue that this ambiguity about religious commit-
ment, as a matter of choice or identity, surfaces in the Amselem court’s 
definition of freedom of religion.  
V. THE AMSELEM DECISION: INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY AND 
CULTURAL ACCOMMODATION 
The majority judgment of Iacobucci J. seemed to regard freedom 
of religion as a distinct right, and not simply as part of a more encom-
passing freedom of conscience and religion. As a consequence, it was 
                                                                                                                                
26
  Id., at para. 40. See also id., at para. 40 where Iacobucci J. quoted Dickson C.J. in R. v. 
Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 at 337:  
The essence of the concept of freedom of religion is the right to entertain such religious be-
liefs as a person chooses, the right to declare religious beliefs openly and without fear of 
hindrance or reprisal, and the right to manifest religious beliefs by worship and practice or 
by teaching and dissemination. 
27
  Id., at para. 39. 
28
  While it may be that all religions can be viewed as resting on both personal commitment 
and cultural identity, we tend to see some religions more in terms of the former ― as voluntaristic 
― and others in terms of the latter ― as embedded in larger cultural or ethnic associations. 
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necessary for Iacobucci J. to distinguish religion from other belief 
systems. Early in his judgment, Iacobucci J. considered “what we 
mean by religion”:  
While it is perhaps not possible to define religion precisely, some 
outer definition is useful since only beliefs, convictions and practices 
rooted in religion, as opposed to those that are secular, socially based 
or conscientiously held are protected by the guarantee of freedom of 
religion. Defined broadly, religion typically involves a particular and 
comprehensive system of faith and worship. Religion also tends to 
involve the belief in a divine, superhuman or controlling power. In 
essence, religion is about freely and deeply held personal convictions 
or beliefs connected to an individual’s spiritual faith and integrally 
linked to one’s self-definition and spiritual fulfilment, the practices of 
which allow individuals to foster a connection with the divine or with 
the subject or object of that spiritual faith.
29
 
The problem of distinguishing religious beliefs/practices from secu-
lar beliefs/practices, which has bedevilled the American courts, was 
something that Canadian courts and commentators thought section 2(a) 
had avoided by creating a single right to freedom of conscience and 
religion. Indeed, in R. v. Big M Drug Mart, Dickson C.J. said that “free-
dom of conscience and religion” in section 2(a) of the Charter formed a 
“single integrated concept.”30 But if freedom of conscience and religion 
are part of a single integrated right, that protects deeply-held commit-
ments or beliefs about right and truth, there was no need for the Court to 
embark upon the difficult task of determining when a belief or practice 
is religious rather than secular. 
One explanation for the Court’s approach in Amselem may be that 
section 3 of the Quebec Charter lists freedom of religion and freedom of 
conscience separately, as two rights in a longer list that includes free-
dom of expression, freedom of association and freedom of assembly, no 
more linked to each other than to the other listed freedoms. In contrast, 
section 2(a) of the Canadian Charter appears to protect a single right to 
freedom of conscience and religion, which is distinct from the freedoms 
                                                                                                                                
29
  Id., at para. 39. 
30
  R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, at 346. While 
the issue in Big M was religious compulsion, Dickson C.J. was clear that fundamental beliefs or 
values that were not part of a religious belief system were also protected under s. 2(a) of the Char-
ter.  
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listed under other subsections, such as freedom of expression, section 
2(b), and freedom of association, section 2(d). Nevertheless, as noted 
above, Iacobucci J. insisted that his discussion of freedom of religion 
under the Quebec Charter was equally applicable to section 2(a) of the 
Canadian Charter.  
Moreover, Iacobucci J.’s decision in Amselem to protect non-
mandatory practices from state restriction is workable only if the protec-
tion of section 3/section 2(a) is confined to spiritual beliefs and practices 
or only if such beliefs/practices receive special protection under section 
3/section 2(a). For it is difficult to see how a court could take such a 
broad approach to freedom of conscience, and extend protection to any 
belief/practice that an individual might consider important or valuable, 
but not obligatory. Indeed, an individual’s objection to a particular law 
is characterized by the courts as “conscientious” only when the individ-
ual believes that he or she is morally bound not to conform with the 
law.
31
 It simply cannot be the case that any practice (not tied to a reli-
gious belief system) that an individual considers important but not mor-
ally necessary, is protected under the Charter and subject to restriction 
by the state only on substantial and compelling grounds. 
The implication of Iacobucci J.’s exclusive focus on religious be-
liefs/practices, in his discussion of section 3 of the Quebec Charter (and 
section 2(a) of the Canadian Charter), and his inclusion of non-
mandatory religious practices within the scope of the freedom, is that 
religious beliefs/practices are different from secular or non-religious 
beliefs and deserve special protection. Most notably, in this and other 
cases, the courts have held that state and private actors have an obliga-
tion to accommodate minority religious practices, even if this involves 
some compromise of legitimate public goals or private interests. The 
state may restrict religious practices only for compelling reasons. State 
or private actors will sometimes be precluded from advancing otherwise 
legitimate purposes, such as the protection of property aesthetics and 
values, when these interfere with the religious practices of some com-
munity members. There does not seem to be any similar requirement 
that the state, or private property owners, accommodate non-religious 
beliefs and practices ― at least to the extent of compromising their 
legitimate interests. In a democratic community, individuals are often 
                                                                                                                                
31
  See e.g., Maurice v. Canada (Attorney General), [2002] F.C.J. No. 72, 210 D.L.R. (4th) 
186 (T.D.) and US v. Seeger 380 U.S. 163 (1965). 
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subject to laws with which they disagree. The individual’s liberty to act 
on his or her fundamental, but non-religious, beliefs must give way to 
democratically selected public purposes that advance or protect the 
rights and interests of others.
32
 
Upon what does this special protection of religious belief/practice 
rest? If religious beliefs/practices are valuable because they have been 
chosen, or because they are the product of autonomous judgment, then 
non-religious moral or fundamental beliefs may be no less deserving 
of protection. It is sometimes argued that religious beliefs/practices are 
different because they address fundamental questions about existence 
and morality and because their adherents often believe that divine 
sanction will be imposed upon them if they fail to meet their spiritual 
obligations. While these factors certainly play a role in our intuition 
that religious beliefs or commitments are special or different, they may 
not provide a sufficient answer to those who argue that their non-
religious beliefs about life and value are of central importance to them 
and are no less binding, and so no less deserving of respect and ac-
commodation. In any event, according to the majority in Amselem the 
protection of section 3/section 2(a) extends to practices that are not 
binding on the individual. 
Religious beliefs and practices may deserve special legal or consti-
tutional protection not because they are an expression of individual 
autonomy or because they are divinely mandated but because they con-
nect the individual to a cultural community or because they are part of 
his or her deeply-rooted cultural identity.
33
 While the individual under-
                                                                                                                                
32
  Furthermore, when the courts protect non-religious beliefs from restriction or interfer-
ence, it is almost always religious beliefs and practices from which they are protected. The courts 
have also held that the state may not favour or support the practices of one faith over another. Non-
religious beliefs, however, do not generally receive the same protection from government interfer-
ence or favouritism. Religion remains at the centre of the courts’ understanding of the freedom, 
either as something that needs to be protected or something from which protection is needed. 
Religious beliefs/practices are viewed as both more threatening and more vulnerable that secular 
beliefs/practices in the life of the community. 
33
  In Amselem, [2004] S.C.J. No. 46, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551 at para. 87, per Iacobucci J.:  
In a multi-ethnic and multicultural country such as ours, which accentuates and advertises 
its modern record of respecting cultural diversity and human rights and of promoting toler-
ance of religious and ethnic minorities ....the argument of the respondent that nominal, min-
imally intruded-upon aesthetic interests should outweigh the exercise of the appellants’ 
religious freedom is unacceptable. 
In the opening sentence of his judgment, Iacobucci J. declared that “An important feature of 
our constitutional democracy is respect for minorities, which includes, of course, religious minori-
ties.” (id., at para. 1). 
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stands his or her religious beliefs as true, and therefore, in theory at 
least, as open to revision in the face of evidence of another truth, these 
beliefs are shaped by his or her family and cultural community and 
represent an important part of his or her world-view and the ground 
upon which he or she takes action and makes judgments. If religion is 
part of an individual’s identity, when the state treats different religious 
beliefs and practices unequally it also treats the adherents of these dif-
ferent belief systems unequally and when it bases public action on reli-
gious grounds it signals to those who do not adhere to the preferred faith 
that they are less worthy and are not fully part of the political commu-
nity. 
In upholding the right of the appellants to erect their own succahs, 
despite the condominium by-laws, Iacobucci J. emphasized not simply 
the value of individual autonomy in spiritual matters, but also the impor-
tance of cultural diversity and the multi-ethnic, multi-cultural, character 
of Canada. Justice Iacobucci’s defence of a broad protection of religious 
practice, that extends beyond religious obligation to include “religious 
custom,” seemed to rest on the importance of cultural identity. When 
defending the protection of non-mandatory religious practices, 
Iacobucci J. asked: 
Is Jewish yarmulke or Sikh turban worthy of less recognition simply 
because it may be borne out of religious custom, not obligation? 
Should an individual Jew, who may personally deny the modern 
relevance of literal biblical “obligation” or “commandment”, be 
precluded from making a freedom of religion argument despite the fact 
that for some reason he or she sincerely derives a closeness to his or 
her God by sitting in a succah? Surely not.
34
 
In Iacobucci J.’s reasoning, the protection of the individual’s religious 
or cultural identity and the community’s religious or cultural diversity, 
seemed to play as great a role as the protection of individual autonomy 
in spiritual matters. 
Yet this view of religion, as a matter of deeply-rooted identity, or 
cultural practice, fits awkwardly with Iacobucci J.’s insistence that 
religion is “a function of personal autonomy and choice” and that a 
                                                                                                                                
34
  Id., at para. 68. 
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claimant under section 2(a) need only show that his or her spiritual 
belief is sincere.
35
  
The two Rabbis, who gave evidence at trial, took different positions 
on the question of whether residing in a personal succah was a religious 
obligation. Justice Iacobucci, understandably, wanted to avoid having to 
resolve issues of religious doctrine.
36
 The Court’s role was not to decide 
what is required by a particular belief system or which interpretation of 
that system is correct or superior.
37
 According to Iacobucci J. the Court 
should consider the sincerity of an individual’s belief but not its validity 
― neither its objective truth, nor the extent of its acceptance within the 
particular religious community. The protection of an individual’s reli-
gious belief/practice rests not on its truth, nor on its place in an estab-
lished belief system, but instead on its connection to the individual, as a 
choice or judgment or as an expression of his or her autonomy. Justice 
Iacobucci did not simply acknowledge that religious beliefs and identi-
ties are contestable and changeable and that there is (at least from a 
public perspective) no single authentic version of Judaism or any other 
established religion. Instead, he held that “religious belief is intensely 
personal and can easily vary from one individual to another.”38 Freedom 
of religion, he said, is a matter of “personal choice and individual 
autonomy and freedom.”39 Each individual must be free to make his or 
her own judgment and hold to his or her own faith.  
It should be noted that determining the sincerity of an individual’s 
belief may be very difficult, if his or her belief is “intensely personal” 
and not tied to an established belief system or shared with others and if 
                                                                                                                                
35
  Id., at para. 42. 
36
  Id., at para. 55, per Iacobucci J.:  
This approach to freedom of religion effectively avoids the invidious interference of the 
State and its courts with religious belief. The alternative would undoubtedly result in un-
warranted intrusions into the religious affairs of the synagogues, churches, mosques, tem-
ples and religious facilities of the nation with value-judgment indictments of those beliefs 
that may be unconventional or not mainstream. 
37
  Id., at para. 50, per Iacobucci J.:  
In my view, the State is in no position to be, nor should it become, the arbiter of religious 
dogma. Accordingly, courts should avoid judicially interpreting and thus determining, either 
explicitly or implicitly, the content of a subjective understanding of religious requirement, 
“obligation”, precept, “commandment”, custom or ritual. Secular judicial determinations of 
theological or religious disputes, or of contentious matters of religious doctrine, unjustifi-
ably entangle the court in the affairs of religion. 
38
  Id., at para. 54. 
39
  Id., at para. 40. 
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it is changeable or “vacillating” so that the court’s inquiry “should focus 
not on past practice or past belief but on a person’s belief at the time of 
the alleged interference with his or her religious freedom.” 40 
If religious commitment is a matter of individual choice, can it also 
be fundamental (a part of the individual’s identity or “self-definition”) 
and can it be distinguished from personal, deeply held, non-religious 
views? If freedom of religion is about individual autonomy, rather than 
cultural identity, it is difficult to explain why non-religious beliefs, 
which are also the product of individual choice or judgment, should not 
receive the same protection as religious beliefs/practices. It is also diffi-
cult to explain why public and private actors should sometimes be re-
quired to compromise their pursuit of legitimate purposes in order to 
accommodate minority religious practices. Or, from the other direction, 
it is difficult to explain why freedom of religion should protect more 
than the individual’s liberty to make and follow moral judgments ― a 
liberty that may be limited when it interferes with the rights and inter-
ests of others.  
V. CONCLUSION 
The court’s ambiguity about the character of religious commitment, 
as either a matter of personal choice/judgment or cultural identity, may 
be unavoidable. Religious belief is not simply a fixed attribute or char-
acteristic. The individual’s commitment to a set of religious beliefs rests 
on his or her judgment or acceptance that they are true or right and that 
other views are false. As such these beliefs must, in theory at least, be 
open to reconsideration on the basis of evidence or argument. Moreover, 
religious beliefs or values often have public implications. Most religions 
have something to say about how we should live our lives in the larger 
community and, more generally, about the kind of society we should 
work to create. But religion is not simply a personal choice or prefer-
ence. It is deeply rooted, and tied to the individual’s social or cultural 
membership. It shapes the individual’s understanding of himself/or 
herself and the world.  
                                                                                                                                
40
  Id., at para. 53. This reference to the “vacillating nature of religious belief” might sug-
gest that an individual’s religious commitment is weak or superficial.  
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The challenge for the courts is to fit this ambiguous, or complex, 
conception of religious commitment, and individual agency, into a 
rights model that distinguishes between choices that are protected as a 
matter of human liberty (subject to the rights and interests of others) and 
(immutable or unchangeable) traits or attributes that must be respected 
as part of a commitment to human equality. Religious commitment 
defies this choice/attribute dichotomy. Yet the courts seem forced to 
choose: either section 2(a) prohibits the state from interfering with the 
individual’s freedom to make judgments about basic values and to live 
according to those values, subject to limits protecting the rights of others 
and the welfare of the community, or the section requires the state to 
treat different religious (and non-religious) belief systems with equal 
respect. Within the existing constitutional framework any attempt by the 
courts to find a middle ground, to treat religion as both choice and iden-
tity, protecting the individual’s liberty to practice his or her religion, and 
at the same time, treating different religions with equal respect, may 
appear unprincipled, even incoherent. 
 
